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Abstract
Modern autonomous driving systems rely heavily on
deep learning models to process point cloud sensory data;
meanwhile, deep models have been shown to be susceptible
to adversarial attacks with visually imperceptible perturba-
tions. Despite the fact that this poses a security concern
for the self-driving industry, there has been very little ex-
ploration in terms of 3D perception, as most adversarial
attacks have only been applied to 2D flat images. In this pa-
per, we address this issue and present a method to generate
universal 3D adversarial objects to fool LiDAR detectors.
In particular, we demonstrate that placing an adversarial
object on the rooftop of any target vehicle to hide the vehicle
entirely from LiDAR detectors with a success rate of 80%.
We report attack results on a suite of detectors using vari-
ous input representation of point clouds. We also conduct
a pilot study on adversarial defense using data augmenta-
tion. This is one step closer towards safer self-driving under
unseen conditions from limited training data.
1. Introduction
Modern autonomous driving systems use deep neural
networks (DNNs) to process LiDAR point clouds in order
to perceive the world [20, 34, 45]. Despite introducing sig-
nificant performance improvements, DNNs have been pre-
viously found to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks when
using image inputs [35, 15, 18, 2], where a small perturba-
tion in the input pixels can cause drastic changes in the out-
put predictions. The potential vulnerabilities, in conjunc-
tion with the safety-critical nature of self-driving, motivate
us to investigate the possibility of disrupting autonomous
driving systems with adversarial attacks.
Image perturbations alone however, are not enough for
modern autonomous driving systems, which are typically
equipped with LiDAR sensors producing point clouds as the
primary main sensory input. Several previous works have
shown successful attacks [36, 39, 43] with point cloud per-
turbations, generating salient modifications by adding, re-
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Figure 1: In this work we produce a physically realizable
adversarial object that can make vehicles “invisible”. Af-
ter placing the object on the rooftop of a target vehicle, the
vehicle will no longer be detected by a LiDAR detector.
moving, and modifying points. Although these attacks work
in theory, arbitrary to point clouds are not always physically
realizable. For instance, a given point cloud may be impos-
sible to generate from a LiDAR sensor due to the lasers’
fixed angular frequencies and light projection geometry.
Towards generating physically realizable attacks, Cao
et al. [7] propose to learn an adversarial mesh capable of
generating adversarial point clouds with a LiDAR renderer.
However, their work only considers learning an adversar-
ial mesh for a few specific frames. As a result, the learned
3D object is not universal and may not be reused in other
3D scenes. Moreover, they have only evaluated their attack
on a very small in-house dataset that contains around a few
hundred frames.
In contrast to [7], we aim to learn a universal and physi-
cally realizable adversary. Furthermore, we craft 3D objects
in a novel setting where they are placed on top of vehicles as
rooftop cargo. Such objects can be used in any scene and on
any types of small vehicles, and can hide the entire host ve-
hicle from a strong LiDAR detector [41] with a success rate
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of 80% at IoU 0.7. By comparison, placing a random object
on the rooftop only produces a small drop in detection accu-
racy. We evaluated our learned adversarial object on a suite
of common LiDAR detector architectures that take in vari-
ous kinds of input representations, and we also report trans-
ferability of attacks across these models. Lastly, we conduct
a pilot study on adversarial defense using data augmentation
and adversarial training. Applying defense mechanisms sig-
nificantly decreases the likelihood of missing detections of
vehicles with strange roof-top cargo, which is a rare-seen
but practical scenario for self-driving cars.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows:
1. We propose a universal adversarial attack on LiDAR
detectors with physically realizable 3D meshes.
2. We present a novel setting where the adversarial object
makes the target vehicle invisible when placed on the
vehicle rooftop.
3. We report a thorough evaluation across different detec-
tor, each using different input representations.
4. We present a successful defense mechanism via train-
ing with data augmentation.
In the following, we first review prior literature on adver-
sarial attacks and in particular point cloud and 3D physical
attacks. Next we present details of our proposed method to
generate a physically realizable adversarial object, followed
by empirical evaluations of our attack and defense on sev-
eral LiDAR object detectors.
2. Related Work
Despite the impressive performance of deep learning
models, they are surprisingly vulnerable to minuscule per-
turbations. Adversarial attacks add visually imperceptible
noise to the input to drastically alters a neural network’s
output and produce false predictions.
Image attacks: Adversarial examples were first discov-
ered in the context of image classification networks [35].
These vulnerabilities were later discovered in networks
performing image detection and semantic segmentation as
well [40]. Attacks can either be white box [15, 28, 26],
where the target model’s weights are available, or black box
[4, 29, 10], where the adversary can only query the outputs
of the target model. Various defense mechanisms, includ-
ing adversarial training [15, 26], denoiser [21], Bayes clas-
sifier [33], certified defense [37, 32] have been proposed,
and shown effective on a certain range of attack types.
Point cloud attacks: With the rise of LiDAR sensors in
robotics applications such as self-driving, point cloud data
has become a popular input representation. Some recent re-
search demonstrated the possibility of adversarial attacks on
networks that take point cloud data as input. [42] proposed
to add, remove, or perturb points; whereas [39] added clus-
ters of adversarial points. [44, 36] proposed saliency-based
approaches for removing points. Several structured meth-
ods have been also introduced to perturb point clouds with
the goal of preserving physical fidelity [23].
Physical world attacks: Perturbing image pixels or point
locations alone may not guarantee that the attack can hap-
pen in the physical world. To address this issue, several
works have produced physical adversaries and expose real
world threats. [18] studies whether the image pixel pertur-
bations can be realized by a physical printer. [5] produces
a universal and robust adversarial sticker. When placed on
any image with any pose, the sticker induces a targeted false
classification. [13] proposes to train the attack with differ-
ent view angles and distances to make it robust. [2] synthe-
sizes robust adversarial 3D objects capable of fooling im-
age classifiers when rendered into an image from any angle.
[43, 24] consider perturbing other photo-realistic properties
such as shape normal and lighting, using a differentiable
renderer. Nevertheless, in these approaches, the final out-
puts are still projected to 2D image space.
In the context of self-driving and LiDAR perception, [7]
propose LidarAdv, a method to learn adversarial meshes to
fool LiDAR detectors. Our work is different from theirs in
several important ways. First, LidarAdv only considers one
frame during learning and hence is input specific; whereas
we train our adversary on all frames and all vehicles, cre-
ating a universal adversary. Second, our adversary can be
placed on a vehicle roof to hide it, whereas their adversar-
ial object does not interact with other real world objects.
Lastly, we are the first to conduct a thorough evaluation of a
physically realizable adversarial attack on a suite of detec-
tors and on a public large scale LiDAR benchmark. Besides
learning a physical mesh, [6] proposes to use laser devices
to spoof LiDAR points. These laser devices, however, are
more difficult to set up and it is not trivial to create consis-
tent point clouds as the sensor moves.
3. Physically Realizable Adversarial Examples
In this section, we present our method for learning an ad-
versarial object to attack LiDAR detectors. There are many
possible ways to place an object in a scene for an adversar-
ial effect, as explored in [7]. For example, one can hide the
inserted adversarial object or change the object label (e.g.,
making the detector believe that the adversarial object is a
pedestrian). In this paper, we instead focus on a novel set-
ting, where we place the object on the rooftop of a vehicle
and hide the vehicle from the detector, hence creating an
“invisible” car, illustrated in Figure 2. Such a procedure can
be easily reproduced in the real world and is also plausible
even without the presence of a malicious attacker, since cars
occasionally carry pieces of furniture or sports equipment
on their rooftops.
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Figure 2: Overall adversarial example generation pipeline. We start from a mesh representation, and use a LiDAR renderer
to obtain the point clouds. By using roof approximation techniques, we attach the adversarial point cloud on top of the target
vehicle, and we modify the mesh vertices so that the detection confidence score of the target vehicle is minimized.
For the rest of this section, we first describe the 3D rep-
resentation of the adversarial example and how to render it
into a point clouds. We then present our adversarial exam-
ple generation algorithms. Lastly, a simple defense algo-
rithm based on data augmentation is presented.
3.1. Surface Parameterization
Many parameterizations exist for 3D objects, including
voxels, meshes, and implicit surfaces [16]. Voxels are easy
to compute but require significantly more memory than the
alternatives to produce a high level of detail. Implicit sur-
faces, on the other hand, provide compact representations
but are harder to render since they require solving for the
numerical roots of the implicit functions. In this paper,
we choose to represent our adversary with a mesh since it
benefits from compact representations and allows for effi-
cient and precise rendering. Given a mesh, we can compute
the exact intersections of rays analytically and in a differ-
entiable manner. The latter is important since it allows us
to take gradients efficiently for white box attacks. Further-
more, meshes have previously demonstrated high-fidelity
shape generation results on faces and human bodies [3, 22].
During the learning of the adversarial mesh, following
prior literature [25, 17], we deform a template mesh by
adding local learnable displacement vectors ∆vi ∈ R3 for
each vertex and a global transformation for the entire mesh,
vi = R(v
0
i + ∆vi) + t, (1)
where v0i is the initial vertex position, and R ∈ SO(3) is
a global rotation matrix, and t ∈ R3 is a global translation
vector. To ensure physical feasibility, box constraints are
applied to the mesh vertices as well as the global translation.
In the experiments where we initialize the mesh from an
isotropic sphere, R is fixed to be the identity matrix, since
the sphere is rotation invariant. In the experiments where
we deform common objects, we constrain R to be rotations
on the x-y plane:
R =
cos θ − sin θ 0sin θ cos θ 0
0 0 1
 , (2)
where θ is the learnable rotation angle.
3.2. LiDAR Simulation
We aim to add an adversarial mesh Z into the scene in
a realistic manner and choose the roof of vehicles as the
location for placement, as placing objects on top is easier
due to gravity and does not interfere with adjacent traffic.
Furthermore, objects on top of vehicles are less prone to
occlusion, whereas areas like the front hood or trunk top
may be blocked by another vehicle. Finally, this is a realistic
scenario as it common to strap furniture, canoes, bicycles,
and other large items on top of vehicles. In this section we
first describe how to render a mesh into LiDAR points. Next
we introduce a technique to locate the rooftop region from
a vehicle point cloud, where we can place the adversary.
LiDAR point rendering: We then use location of the
mesh in the scene to sample nearby rays γ with the same
angular frequencies as the LiDAR sensor used to generate
the original LiDAR scene. Given rays γ and meshZ, the ad-
versarial points are rendered with a differentiable raycaster
R. We compute the intersection of rays and mesh faces with
the Moller-Trumbore intersection algorithm [27]. We refer
readers to the supplementary materials for more details on
this. Then, we take the union of the rendered adversarial
points and the original points to create the modified scene.
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Figure 3: Approximating rooftop from vehicle point clouds. We build a low dimensional representation of our vehicle object
bank using PCA, and embed the target vehicle point clouds by optimizing the latent code. The top 0.2m is then cropped to
be the rooftop region.
Rooftop fitting: To approximate the center of a vehicle’s
roof from its point cloud, as illustrated in Figure 3, we first
fit a CAD model to the point cloud. Inspired by [12], we
represent our internal collection of vehicle models as signed
distance functions (SDFs), denoting as F (·; θ), and project
this library of vehicles into a latent space using PCA. Since
SDFs implicitly represent 3D surfaces as its zero level-set,
we optimize the latent code z such that all ground truth ve-
hicle points evaluate as close to 0 as possible. Concretely,
given a vehicle bounding box (x, y, w, h, α), and a set of
points P = {p : p ∈ R3} within the box, we find the opti-
mal latent code z∗ such that
z∗ = arg min
z
∑
p∈P
F (p; θ(z))
2
. (3)
We then apply marching cubes [16] on F (·; θ(z∗)) to obtain
a fitted CAD model. Lastly, we use vertices within the top
0.2m vertical range of the CAD model to approximate the
roof region.
During the attack, we place the adversarial mesh Z with
a fixed pose relative to the roof center of a target vehicle.
Given a vehicle bounding box (x, y, w, h, α), we compute
the roof center (rx, ry, rz) and apply transformation matrix
T =

cosα − sinα 0 rx
sinα cosα 0 ry
0 0 1 rz
0 0 0 1
 (4)
on the adversarial object.
3.3. Adversarial Example Generation
In this section, we first introduce the objective function
being optimized to learn adversarial examples. Both white
box and black box attack algorithms are presented next.
3.3.1 Objective
The overall loss function is a combination of the adversarial
loss and the Laplacian loss for mesh smoothness:
L = Ladv + λLlap. (5)
To generate an adversarial example, we search for vertex
perturbation v and global transformation parameters (R, t)
that minimize the loss function.
For the adversarial loss, following prior work [40], we
also find it necessary to suppress all relevant bounding box
proposals. A proposal is relevant if 1) its confidence score
is greater than 0.1 and 2) if its IoU with the ground truth
bounding box is also greater than 0.1.
Our adversarial objective minimizes the confidence of
the relevant candidates:
Ladv =
∑
y,s∈Y
−IoU(y∗, y) log(1− s), (6)
where Y is the set of relevant bounding box proposals and
each proposal y has a confidence score s. We use binary
cross entropy to minimize the confidence score of the rel-
evant proposals, weighed by the IoU with the ground truth
bounding box y∗. Here, we choose to target negative clas-
sification labels instead of other bounding box parameters
because missing detections are the most problematic.
In addition, a Laplacian loss [25] is applied to regularize
mesh geometry and maintain surface smoothness:
Llap =
∑
i
‖δi‖22, (7)
where δi is the distance from vi to the centroid of its imme-
diate neighbors N(i):
δi = vi − 1‖N(i)‖
∑
j∈N(i)
vj . (8)
3.3.2 Attack Algorithms
In this section we provide details for both white box and
black box attacks for learning mesh vertices.
White box attack: In a white box setting, we simulate
the addition of the adversary in a differentiable manner, and
hence can take the gradient from the objectiveL to the mesh
vertices. In addition, we re-parameterize local and global
displacement vectors to apply box constraints, as [8] have
demonstrated issues with other alternatives. Specifically,
since clipping parameters during projected gradient descent
creates a disparity between parameter updates and momen-
tum updates, we instead re-parameterize mesh vertices to
inherently obey box constraints:
vi = R(b sign(v˜0i ) σ(|v˜0i |+ ∆v˜i)) + c tanh(t˜),
where denotes element-wise multiplication, σ denotes the
sigmoid function, b ∈ R3 define limits on size, and c ∈ R3
define limits on translation. σ(v˜0i ) = v
0
i /b is the normal-
ized initial position of vertex and tanh(t˜) = t/c is the
normalized global translation. The sign function constrains
each vertex to stay in its initial quadrant.
Black box attack: A gradient-based attack is not always
feasible in point cloud perception due to non-differentiable
preprocessing stages that are common in modern point
cloud detection models [41, 19]. For example, models like
PIXOR [41] represent the input as occupancy voxels, pre-
venting gradients from reaching the point cloud. To ad-
dress this problem, we employ a genetic algorithm [1] to
update the mesh parameters. Here, a population of candi-
dates meshes are evolved to maximize the fitness score−L.
At every iteration, the candidate with the highest fitness is
preserved while the rest are replaced. New candidates are
generated by sampling mesh parameters from a pair of old
candidates, with sampling probability proportional to fit-
ness score. We then add gaussian noise to some new can-
didates sampled with a mutation probability. To jointly op-
timize over all samples, we perform inference on multiple
examples and take the average fitness score at each itera-
tion. In this black box setting, we find re-parameterization
unnecessary for gradient-free optimization.
3.4. Defense Mechanisms
Given that rooftop objects are rarely observed in the
training distribution and that our attack produces examples
that are heavily out-of-distribution, we first propose random
data augmentation as a simple defense mechanism. Next,
we consider adversarial training [8] for a stronger defense
against adversarial attacks.
Data augmentation: When training with data augmenta-
tion, in every frame we generate a random watertight mesh
and place it on a random vehicle using the methods pre-
sented previously. This method is not specific to the type
of optimization employed by the attacker (e.g. white box or
black box) and hence may generalize better when compared
to regular adversarial training [15].
To generate a random watertight mesh, we first sample
a set of N vertices V ∈ RN×3 from a Gaussian N (0, σ)
and apply incremental triangulation to obtain a set of con-
nected tetrahedrons Q. We then stochastically remove M
boundary tetrahedrons that do not disconnect Q into sepa-
rate components. Finally, we take the remaining boundary
faces of Q to obtain a watertight surface.
Adversarial training: While adversarial training has em-
pirically been found to be robust, it is expensive and infeasi-
ble when the cost of training an adversary is high. Thus, we
employ a method similar to [38] and take one mesh update
step per model update instead of a full optimization cycle.
During training, the adversary is randomly re-initialized ev-
ery k steps using the same mesh generation method.
4. Experiments
In this section, we first discuss the datasets and mod-
els used in our experiments in Section 4.1 and 4.2, and the
experimental setup in Section 4.3. We then present exper-
imental results on 1) white box and black box attacks, 2)
attacks and transferability on various detection backbones,
3) common object attacks, and 4) adversarial defense using
data augmentation training.
4.1. Datasets
We use the KITTI dataset [14] for training and evaluation
of our attacks. KITTI contains LiDAR point clouds and 3D
bounding box labels for objects seen by the front camera of
the autonomous vehicle. For our experiments, we focus on
the “Car” class only and consider each object in a scene as a
separate sample. Since our method relies on fitting meshes
to point clouds, we discard all samples with less than 10
points. This results in 6864 vehicles in the training set and
6544 vehicles in the validation set. We do not use the test
set as labels are not publicly available. For evaluation we
only consider bounding boxes from a bird’s eye view.
4.2. Target LIDAR Detector Models
In this work, we attack detector models that process
point clouds exclusively without any auxiliary inputs, since
we only learn the shape of the adversarial mesh. We cover
a variety of detector architectures with different input rep-
resentations of the point cloud. Specifically we consider the
following models:
• PIXOR [41] is a detection network that processes in-
put point clouds into occupancy voxels and generates
bounding boxes in a bird’s eye view.
• PIXOR (density) is a variant of PIXOR using density
voxels as inputs. The value of each voxel is calculated
from bilinear interpolation of nearby points’ distance
to the voxel center:
∑
p(1−|px−vx|)(1−|py−vy|)(1−
|pz − vz|). The density variant allows us to compute
gradients to point clouds easier.
• PointRCNN [34] does not voxelize and instead pro-
cesses the raw point cloud directly using a PointNet++
[31] backbone.
• PointPillar [19] groups input points into discrete bins
from BEV and uses PointNet [30] to extract features
for each pillar.
Figure 4: Visualization of our universal adversarial object hiding different car instances at various orientations and locations.
XXXXXXXXXXSource
Target
PIXOR-1 PIXOR-2
PIXOR-1 77.3% 53.9%
PIXOR-2 73.5% 72.1%
Table 1: Attack transferability between two
PIXOR models with different seeds.
XXXXXXXXXXSource
Target
PIXOR PIXOR (d) PointRCNN PointPillar
PIXOR [41] 77.3% 66.0% 20.1% 8.2%
PIXOR (density) [41] 66.4% 80.9% 20.0% 7.7%
PointRCNN [34] 33.3% 33.7% 32.3% 20.5%
PointPillar [19] 54.9% 38.4% 28.4% 57.5%
Table 2: Attack transferability among different detector models.
Since we limit to the scope of learning the mesh shape only,
we use the version of the above detectors that do not take
LiDAR intensity as input.
4.3. Experimental Setup
Implementation details: In our experiments, we initial-
ize the adversarial mesh to be a unit isotropic sphere
with 162 vertices and 320 faces and scale it by b =
(bx, by, bz) = (0.7m, 0.7m, 0.5m). Maximum global off-
set is 0.1m on the x, y direction and no offset is allowed on
the z direction to prevent the mesh from moving into the ve-
hicle or hovering in mid air. For the Laplacian loss, we set
λ = 0.001. During simulation, rays are sampled according
to specs of the Velodyne HDL-64E sensor used to generate
the datasets.
For the gradient-based optimization in white box attacks,
we use Adam with learning rate 0.005. For the genetic al-
gorithm in black box attacks, we initialize mutation std at
0.05, mutation probability at 0.01, use a population size of
16, and average 100 queries to compute fitness. We decay
the mutation std and probability by a factor of 0.5 if the
running fitness has not improved in 100 generations.
4.4. Evaluation Metrics
We consider the following two metrics for attack quality:
• Attack success rate: Attack success rate measures the
percentage at which the target vehicle is successfully de-
tected originally and but not detected after the attack. We
consider a vehicle successfully detected if the output IoU
is greater than 0.7.
• Recall-IoU curve: Since attack success rate depends on
the IoU threshold, we also plot the recall percentage at a
range of IoU threshold to get a more thorough measure
of attack quality.
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Figure 5: Visualization of detection recall across range of
IoUs for PIXOR with density voxels. Difference between
white box and black box attacks is very small. Initial mesh
does not affect detection as much as adversarial mesh.
4.5. Results and Discussion
Comparison of White Box and Black Box We conduct a
white box and black box attack on a variant of PIXOR with
density voxels. We visualize the IoU-recall curve for both
experiments in Figure 5. and show that the attacks signif-
icantly drop the recall. When we use the initial icosphere
mesh as a baseline, it has little impact on detection even
though it is of the same size as the adversary. We further
compare our black box attack against the white box alterna-
tive and show that they achieve similar performance.
Transferability Across Identical Architectures We in-
vestigate the transferability of adversarial examples across
similar models. To this end, we train two variations of the
original PIXOR model using different seeds and learn ad-
versarial meshes for each model separately. We then eval-
uate transferability between the pair of models using attack
success rate as the metric. Results are summarized in Ta-
ble 1 and there is a high degree of transferability between
models with identical architecture. This allows strong trans-
fer attacks with only knowledge of model architecture. [29].
Figure 6: IoU-Recall curve for black box attacks on different detector architectures.
Figure 7: Bird’s eye view visualization of attack success rate at various locations in the scene using different detector models.
Transferability Across Input Representations In this
section we attack four models described in Section 4.2, and
use only black box attacks due to non-differentiable layers
in some models. We provide IoU-Recall curves in Figure 6.
Again, transferability between the models is considered and
results are shown in Table 2.
First, our attack is able to hide objects with high prob-
ability on the PIXOR models and PointPillar but is signif-
icantly weaker on PointRCNN. We hypothesize that this is
because PointRCNN treats every point as a bounding box
anchor. Therefore, vehicles close to the sensor register sig-
nificantly more LiDAR points and proposals, making it ex-
tremely difficult to suppress all proposals. We verify this
hypothesis by visualizing the attack success rate at various
locations across the scene in Figure 7. The success rate on
attacking PointRCNN is close to 0 near the LiDAR sensor
but grows substantially higher as the distance to the sensor
increases and the number of points decreases.
In terms of transferability, the occupancy and density
variants of PIXOR can share a significant portion of adver-
sarial examples. The attacks generated from PointPillar and
PointRCNN can also be used to attack PIXOR, but not vice
versa. This suggests that additional layers of point-level
reasoning before aggregating on the z-dimension probably
make the model more robust to rooftop objects.
In addition, two variations of PIXOR have different vul-
nerable regions even though they share the same backbone.
Specifically, we note that vehicles close to the LiDAR sen-
sor are the easiest targets when using a density voxel input
representation. In contrast, vehicles closeby are the most
robust to attacks when using occupancy voxels. We spec-
ulate that this is an effect of the input precision. For den-
sity voxels, the number of points is significantly higher near
the LiDAR sensor, contributing to higher input precision,
whereas occupancy voxels can only show a binary indicator
whether a voxel contains a point or not.
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Figure 8: We perform our attack on two similar models.
PIXOR converts the input point cloud to occupancy vox-
els and PIXOR* separates points into columns and extracts
features with a pointnet backbone. Although the models
have the same backbone architecture, PIXOR* is signifi-
cantly more robust due to the input representation.
Based on the above observations, we conclude that the
choice of input representation and detection scheme may
have significant implications on robustness to adversarial
examples. For a more concrete comparison, we consider a
variant of PIXOR using PointPillar’s pillar representation
instead of voxelization and keep the backbone architecture
identical. We compare this variant, PIXOR* against PIXOR
and show the results in Figure 8. Here, we can see that
Object Initial Success Classification Adversarial Success Classification Dimensions
Couch 23.3% 93.1 % 68.6% 93.8 % 1.69m x 0.85m x 0.94m
Canoe 26.9% 99.6 % 59.5% 99.9 % 3.51m x 0.81m x 0.68m
Table 18.9% 99.8 % 48.0% 99.7 % 1.57m x 0.83m x 0.86m
Cabinet 20.7% 93.4 % 54.1% 94.2 % 1.29m x 0.91m x 0.76m
Chair 14.1% 99.9 % 23.3% 99.9 % 1.42m x 0.64m x 0.71m
Bike 19.6% 94.4 % 32.4% 92.3 % 1.70m x 0.76m x 1.08m
Table 3: Adversaries resembling common objects that could appear on the rooftop. Attack success rates on the initial and
adversarial configurations are shown. A ShapeNet classifier stably recognizes our adversaries as the correct object class.
Arbitrary Couch Canoe Table Cabinet Chair Bike AP
Original 77.3% 68.6% 59.5% 48.0% 54.1% 23.3% 32.4% 74.37
Augmentation 14.4% 12.4% 19.6% 11.5% 7.3% 6.6% 14.0% 74.92
Adv Train 10.8% 5.6% 18.7% 4.9% 5.3% 6.3% 11.4% 73.97
Table 4: Attack success rates before and after applying defense training on PIXOR. In the final column, we evaluate the
models on the standard KITTI validation set and show the average precision (AP) at 0.7 IoU.
with even with identical backbones and training routines,
PIXOR* is significantly more robust to our attack purely
due to a different input representation.
Common Objects In this section, to make attacks more
realistic, we learn adversaries that resemble common ob-
jects that may appear on top of a vehicle in the real world.
Instead of deforming an icosphere, we initialize from a
common object mesh and deform the vertices while con-
straining the maximum perturbation distances. We choose
couch, chair, table, bike, and canoe as six common object
classes, and we take the object meshes from ShapeNet [9].
We apply uniform mesh re-sampling in meshlab [11] to re-
duce the number of faces and produce regular geometry
prior to deformation. In these experiments we limit the
maximum vertex perturbation to 0.03m so that the adver-
sary will resemble the common object, and limit translation
to 0.1m, and allow free rotation. In Table 3, we present the
visualizations, results, and dimensions of the common ob-
jects. Moreover, the identity of the adversarial objects are
unambiguous to a human, and we also verify that a Point-
Net [31] classifier trained on ShapeNet [9] is also able to
correctly classify our perturbed objects. This confirms the
possibility that the placement of common objects can also
hurt LiDAR detectors.
Adversarial Defense We employ our proposed defense
methods by retraining a PIXOR model with random data
augmentation and adversarial training. To generate ran-
dom meshes for data augmentation, we uniformly sample
N from [50, 200], M from [0, 300], and we sample vertices
from Gaussian N (0, 0.5). If all tetrahedrons are removed
by decimation, the sampling process restarts. During train-
ing, for every scene we sample one vehicle at random for
data augmentation. We only augment vehicles with at least
10 points in the scene, otherwise it is too difficult to fit a
mesh for roof approximation. During adversarial training,
we set k = 30 and alternate between updating the mesh and
the model.
For evaluation, we re-train an adversarial mesh on the
defended model and observe that the attack success rate is
reduced significantly, as shown in Table 4. In addition, we
also launch attacks with common objects on the defended
model and observe similar findings. Furthermore, for the
standard detection task, our defended models achieve sim-
ilar or better performance when evaluated on the KITTI
validation set. Nevertheless, the defense is not yet per-
fect since there is still 5-20% attack success rate remaining.
With more computational resources, full adversarial train-
ing could possibly close this gap.
5. Conclusion
We propose a robust, universal, and physical realizable
adversarial example capable of hiding vehicles from LiDAR
detectors. An attacker can 3D print the mesh and place it
on any vehicle to make it “invisible” without prior knowl-
edge of the scene. The attack will consistently cause tar-
get vehicles to disappear, severely impeding downstream
tasks in autonomous driving systems. Even without any
malicious intent, we show that problematic shapes can co-
incidentally appear with common objects such as a sofa.
We further show that training with data augmentation us-
ing random meshes can significantly improve the robust-
ness, but unfortunately still not 100% secure against our at-
tack. By demonstrating the vulnerability of LiDAR percep-
tion against universal 3D adversarial objects, we emphasize
the need for more robust models in safety-critical robotics
applications like self-driving.
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